

Mobile Money, Interoperability and Financial Inclusion

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LIFT-IFC Conference



The Rise of Mobile Money

The Rise of Mobile Money



The Rise of Mobile Money



Widespread digital payment system

The Rise of Mobile Money



Widespread digital payment system

Beyond payments: risk-sharing, remittances, lending

The Rise of Mobile Money



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Beyond payments: risk-sharing, remittances, lending

Less on the financial institution

The Rise of Mobile Money



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Beyond payments: risk-sharing, remittances, lending

Less on the financial institution: the mobile money company

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Interoperability

The Rise of Mobile Money



Widespread digital payment system

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Interoperability: a competition-enhancing policy to facilitate payments across platforms

Research Question

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How does interoperability affect the behaviour of mobile money companies

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How does interoperability affect the behaviour of mobile money companies and financial inclusion?

This Paper

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Theoretical Framework

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Many potential models & equilibria

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Many potential models & equilibria, ours data-oriented

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Tradeoff between competition & financial inclusion

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Vertical integration between mobile network and money

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Evidence on *fees* and regulation of mobile money


Mobile Money and Interoperability

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Mobile
Money

Mobile Money and Interoperability




Mobile
Network




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
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
Mobile Money and Interoperability



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Mobile Money and Interoperability



High Fees

Mobile Money and Interoperability

Big Network



Vertical
Integration
Tradeoff



High Fees




Mobile
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
Mobile
Money

Mobile Money and Interoperability

Interoperability



Mobile Money and Interoperability



Mobile Money and Interoperability

Small Network



Interoperability




Low Fees

Paper in 2 pictures - 1 fees


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
Paper in 2 pictures - 1 fees



Paper in 2 pictures - 2 coverage



Paper in 2 pictures - 2 coverage



Our findings - detailed

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Descriptive: mobile money fees are high as a % of payment

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“on-network” 4%,

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decline in fin. inclusion - various metrics of inclusion + amplified by network!

Why do signal & towers ↓ ?

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Variable cost or sunk cost?

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Variable cost or sunk cost? Towers sunk in HICs

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Relevant for the economics of dig. platforms (data servers, infra, innovation)

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Mixed effects of competition on consumers and investment

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Our contribution: granular data, empirical design, mobile money market

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Our contribution: study the mobile money compa



A “Compressed” Roadmap

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1. Data & Identification

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2. Empirical Analysis

A “Compressed” Roadmap

1. Data & Identification

2. Empirical Analysis

3. Robustness Checks

Data & Identification

Data

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2010-2021, through Wayback Machines (next slide)

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Fin. Inclusion → Global Findex WB & IMF FAS

Mobile Money Fees - MTN Uganda, March 2023

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Amount (UGX)		Sending Money	
Min	Max	To MTN	To Other Networks
500	2,500	100	100
2,501	5,000	100	100
5,001	15,000	500	500
15,001	30,000	500	500

Note: <https://www.mtn.co.ug/insight/mobile-money-tariffs/>

Mobile Money Fees - Wayback Machine



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Archive-It enables you to capture, manage and search collections of digital content without any technical expertise or hosting facilities. [Visit Archive-It to build and browse the collections.](#)



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SEARCH

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SAVE F

Capture a well
trusted citation

Note: <https://web.archive.org/>



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FinTech

Descriptives

B, L, S

M. Money & Interoperability



Descriptives

1. Summary Stats ×

Descriptives

1. Summary Stats ×
2. Fees and Brackets ✓


Descriptives

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3. Geographic and Time variation ×

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4. GSMA data at operator-country ✓

2. Fees and Brackets




3. GSMA Data at Operator-Country Level

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
Note: example country in Africa

3. GSMA Data at Operator-Country Level




Note: example country in Africa, operator 1

3. GSMA Data at Operator-Country Level



Note: example country in Africa, operator 2

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Note: example country in Africa, operators 1 & 2

Identification: Interoperability - 2015

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Interoperability - 2017




Interoperability - 2019



Interoperability - 2021




Empirical Analysis



On-net Fees, specification

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \sum_{k=-5}^5 \gamma_k I\{K_{ict} = k\} + \varepsilon_{ict}$$




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


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
$$Y_{bicy} = \alpha_b + \beta_i + \gamma_y + \sum_b \delta_b \text{Interoperability}_{icy} \times \alpha_{icy}$$




Fees, before interoperability



Fees, after interoperability



Operator-District Evidence







Table: Network Coverage and Interoperability - Operator-District Level

Variables	(1) Total Coverage	(2) Probability of Signal
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-4.811** (2.149)	-0.036* (0.021)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,113,012	1,113,012
Mean Dep. Var.	67.4	0.856

Note: Clustered SEs at the operator level.

District Evidence






Table: Network Coverage and Interoperability - District Level

Variables	(1) Total Coverage	(2) Prob. Signal	(3) Number MNOs
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-5.024** (2.147)	-0.034* (0.020)	-0.186** (0.077)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569,760	569,760	569,760
Mean Dep. Var.	65.2	0.825	1.673

Note: Clustered SEs at the district level.

Financial Inclusion

Table: Financial Inclusion and Interoperability

Variables	(1) Access Emerg. Funds	(2) Domestic Remittances	(3) Wage on Phone	(4) Num. of Accounts	(5) Num. of Trans.s
<i>Inter.ty_{cy}</i>	-0.040 (0.048)	-0.078*** (0.019)	-0.062 (0.080)	-0.042 (0.117)	-0.256*** (0.088)
Ind. Cont.	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	90710	75026	17263	360	230
M. D. V.	0.456	0.286	0.119	16.592	20.074

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<i>Inter.ty_{cy}</i>	-0.071* (0.041)	-0.087*** (0.018)	-0.111** (0.047)	0.115 (0.103)	-0.145 (0.119)
<i>Inter.ty_{cy} × MM Network_c</i>	-0.088* (0.046)	-0.024* (0.013)	-0.226* (0.124)	-0.453*** (0.104)	-0.181 (0.131)
Ind. Cont.	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	90710	75026	17263	360	230
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Policy Proposal

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B, L, S

M. Money & Interoperability



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Empirical Test: verify whether rural subsidies prevent lower service with interoperability

Table: Interoperability and Rural Subsidies

	Local development		Night Light intensity	
	Rural (1)	Urban (2)	< median (3)	> median (4)
Interoperability _{ct}	-7.613*** (0.417)	-2.453*** (0.193)	-5.433*** (0.624)	-0.485*** (0.145)
Subsidy _{ct}	-1.079*** (0.324)	-4.088*** (0.123)	-1.684*** (0.201)	-0.930*** (0.052)
Interoperability _{ct} × Subsidy _{ct}	5.527*** (0.452)	-3.205*** (0.201)	4.107*** (0.626)	-0.559*** (0.152)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	183660	386100	94608	94608
Adj. R sq.	0.927	0.888	0.949	0.917
Mean Dep. Var.	61.147	73.380	75.490	94.427



Robustness Checks

Additional

Additional

1. Application of Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2021) Borusyak

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2. Application of Sun and Abraham (2021) Sun

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9. Telecommunication Tariffs Telco

Conclusion

Concluding Remarks

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→ tradeoff between competition and fin. inclusion

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 - benefits & costs of interoperability

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→ benefits & costs of interoperability

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Concluding Remarks

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3. The regulation of digital payment platforms → My agenda in Finance & Development
 - Excited to be (even though virtually) at such an exciting conference!

Thank You

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We apply the work of Borusyak et al (2021), which is the ideal reference to address these issues

Table: Fees and Interoperability - Borusyak et al

	(1)	(2)
Variables	On-Network Fees	Cross-Network Fees
<i>ATE</i>	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.004)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	611	411

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Table: Operator-District and Interoperability - Borusyak et al

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage
<i>ATE</i>	-5.688** (2.602)	-0.042 (0.031)
District-Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,113,012	1,113,012

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Table: Operator Information and Interoperability - Borusyak et al

Variables	(1) Total Coverage	(2) Market Participation	(3) Total Revenue	(4) Towers	(5) EBIT
<i>ATE</i>	-0.196*** (0.021)	-0.227** (0.111)	-0.307** (0.128)	-0.128** (0.064)	-0.060 (0.374)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	125	1842	1684	280	366
M. D. V.	4.358	2.270	17.989	7.179	16.284

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Table: District and Interoperability - Borusyak et al

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage	(3) Number of MNOs
<i>ATE</i>	-5.755*** (1.530)	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.230** (0.095)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569,760	569,760	569,760

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Table: Fees and Interoperability - Sun and Abraham

Variables	(1) On-Network Fees	(2) Cross-Network Fees
<i>ATE</i>	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.007** (0.003)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	611	411

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Table: Operator-District and Interoperability - Sun and Abraham

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage
<i>ATE</i>	-11.893*** (4.177)	-0.105** (0.053)
District-Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,113,012	1,113,012

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Table: Operator Information and Interoperability - Sun and Abraham

Variables	(1) Total Coverage	(2) Market Pe.tion	(3) Total Revenue	(4) Towers	(5) EBIT
<i>ATE</i>	-0.230*** (0.087)	-0.251* (0.148)	-0.316* (0.171)	-0.115** (0.058)	-0.020 (0.425)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	125	1842	1684	280	366
M. D. V.	4.358	2.270	17.989	7.179	16.284

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Table: Operator-District and Interoperability - Sun and Abraham

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage	(3) Number of MNOs
<i>ATE</i>	-9.211*** (2.645)	-0.074* (0.041)	-0.418** (0.174)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569,760	569,760	569,760

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3. Signal & Heterogeneity

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This slide we focus on some key determinants of heterogeneity

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Following empirical model

$$Y_{dcy} = \alpha_d + \beta_y + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{cy} + \psi \text{Interoperability}_{cy} \times \text{Var} + \varepsilon_{dcy}$$

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district & year fixed effects, α_d and β_y

Var - captures distinguishes between rural vs urban districts,
following Cattaneo et al (2021) and sat. lights, and dominant
operators

Table: Coverage, Rural Districts and Interoperability

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage	(3) Number of Operators
<i>Interoperability_{cy}</i>	-4.058*** (0.080)	-0.033*** (0.000)	-0.166*** (0.002)
<i>Interoperability_{cy}</i> × <i>Rural_{dt0}</i>	-2.393** (0.231)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.051*** (0.002)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569,760	569,760	569,760
Mean Dep. Var.	65.2	0.825	1.673

Table: Coverage, Nightlights and Interoperability

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage	(3) Number of Operators
<i>Interoperability_{cy}</i>	-1.803*** (0.187)	-0.006*** (0.000)	-0.046*** (0.002)
<i>Interoperability_{cy}</i> × <i>Lights_{dt0}</i>	0.480*** (0.198)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.029*** (0.002)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	189,216	189,216	189,216
Mean Dep. Var.	84.7	0.936	2.308

Table: Network Coverage and Interoperability - Operator-District Level

Variables	(1) Total Coverage	(2) Probability of Signal
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	4.021 (4.525)	-0.049** (0.023)
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i> × <i>Lights_{jdct0}</i>	-10.206** (4.851)	0.015 (0.013)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,113,012	1,113,012
Mean Dep. Var.	67.4	0.856

Note: Clustered SEs at the operator level.

4. Financial Inclusion Using DHS [Back](#)

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We also use measures of Fin. Inclusion from another source

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DHS - great data!

Con: for this data sources no panel & no country FEs (use individual-level controls instead)

Results in line with previous findings

Table: Financial Inclusion and Interoperability - DHS data

	(1)	(2)
	Probability of Mobile Transaction	
$Interoperability_{cy}$	-0.203*** (0.004)	-0.200*** (0.005)
$Interoperability_{cy} \times$ $Rural_{icy}$		-0.242*** (0.004)
$Rural_{icy}$		0.035*** (0.006)
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	105,478	105,478
Mean Dep. Var.	0.480	0.480

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5. Clustering at Country Level [Back](#)

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Table: Fees and Interoperability

Variables	(1) On-Network Fees	(2) Cross-Network Fees
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.004)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	611	411

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Table: Operator-District and Interoperability

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-4.811** (2.215)	-0.036 (0.022)
District-Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,113,012	1,113,012

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6. Population Weights [Back](#)

Data on global population density - Warszawski et al (2017)

Coverage is pop. count instead of territory

Results are smaller (50%) but very precise

In line with hypothesis of marginal towers

Table: Operator-District and Interoperability - Pop. Weights

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-4.882** (2.022)	-0.035** (0.017)
District-Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,112,880	1,112,880

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Table: District Coverage and Interoperability - Pop. Weights

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage	(3) Number of Operators
<i>Interoperability_{cy}</i>	-4.838** (2.220)	-0.030 (0.019)	-0.165** (0.077)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	645,936	645,936	645,936
Mean Dep. Var.	64.078	0.845	2.009

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7. SIMs per user + heterogeneity [Back](#)

Use aggregated data on the number of SIM cards per country

Verify its correlation with interoperability

Effects heterogeneous wrt this variable

Table: Mobile (SIMs) subscriptions

Variables	(1) Per 100 people	(2) Log Total
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-2.210 (3.746)	-0.043 (0.059)
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	640	640
Mean Dep. Var.	79.617	15.600

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Table: Coverage, Nightlights and Interoperability

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage	(3) Number of Operators
<i>Interoperability_{cy}</i>	-8.415 (6.248)	-0.030 (0.021)	-0.149 (0.102)
<i>Interoperability_{cy}</i> × <i>SIMs_{ct0}</i>	0.057 (0.077)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569,712	569,712	569,712

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8. M&As [Back](#)

We collected data through newspapers and websites

Verify its correlation with interoperability

No effects

Table: Mergers and Acquisitions

Variables	(1) Mergers and Acquisitions	(2)
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-0.018 (0.017)	
<i>Interoperability_{cy}</i>		-0.010 (0.007)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	3408	3408
Mean Dep. Var.	0.009	0.009

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Table: Interoperability Operator and Country - IV

Variables	(1) <i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>
<i>Interoperability_{cy}</i>	0.330*** (0.102)
Operator FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
Obs.	2,340
Mean Dep. Var.	0.034

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Table: Fees and Interoperability - IV

Variables	(1) On-Network Fees	(2) Cross-Network Fees
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.018* (0.010)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
1st Stage F	32.131	22.376
Obs.	611	411
Mean Dep. Var.	0.053	0.125

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Table: Operator-District and Interoperability - IV

Variables	(1) Coverage Share	(2) Probability of any Coverage
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-10.046** (4.347)	-0.108* (0.057)
District-Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
1st Stage F	29.638	29.638
Obs.	1,113,012	1,113,012
Mean Dep. Var.	82.821	0.971

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Table: Operator Information and Interoperability - IV

Variables	(1) Total Coverage	(2) Market Pe.tion	(3) Total Revenue	(4) Towers	(5) EBIT
<i>Inter.ty_{icy}</i>	-0.186*** (0.033)	-0.333* (0.173)	-0.168 (0.209)	-0.218* (0.118)	0.466 (0.512)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1st F		97	77	36	56
Obs.	125	1842	1684	280	366
M. D. V.	4.358	2.270	17.989	7.179	16.284

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Fees of Telecommunications [Back](#)

We have operator-level data on fees for calls, text & MBs

regress these on interoperability

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TelCo Fees

Table: TelCo Fees and Interoperability

Variables	(1) Voice per minute	(2) Data per GB	(3) Messages per SMS
<i>Interoperability_{icy}</i>	-0.002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	392	52	121
Mean Dep. Var.	0.077	0.011	0.018

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