Cora Jane Flood Research Chair
Professor of the Graduate School
Economic Analysis & Policy | Operations & IT Management
Expertise and Research Interests
- Informational and incentive aspects of the design of efficient organizations
- The effect of information technology on the organization of firms
- “Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty” (with D. Wei), in W. Trockel (ed), Social Design: Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz, Springer, 2019
- “Does More Information-gathering Effort Raise or Lower,the Average Quantity Produced?” (with J.G. Shanthikumar and J. Zhou), Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 69, March 2017, 104-117
- “A Newsvendor Who Chooses Informational Effort” (with J.G. Shanthikumar and Junjie Zhou), Production and Operations Management, Vol. 24, No. 1, 110-133, 2015
- “Technological Improvement and the Decentralization Penalty in a Simple Principal/Agent Model” (with Rouchen Liang and Dong Wei), SSRN e-library 2945702, May 2018
- “Are Information-gathering and Producing Complements or Substitutes?” (with J.G. Shanthikumar and Junjie Zhou), Working Paper, January, 2014. SSRN2516174
- “Information Technology and the Organization of Firms.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 13 (2004): 473-515.
- “Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games,” with D. Courtney. Topics in Theoretical Economics (Berkeley Electronic Press) 6, no. 1 (2006).
- “Complementarity and Inefficiency in Sharing Games,” with D. Courtney. Review of Economic Design 13, no. 7 (2009): 7-43.
- “Organization Structure,” in Handbook of Economics and Information Systems, edited by T. Hendershott, 205-290. Elsevier, 2006.
- “Comparing Finite Mechanisms,” with Leonid Hurwicz. Economic Theory 21, 783-841 (2003).
- “Finite Allocation Mechanisms: Approximate Walrasian versus Approximate Direct Revelation,” with Leonid Hurwicz. Economic Theory 21 (2003): 545-572.
- “Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies,” with S. Reichelstein. Journal of Economic Theory (March 1998): 106-141.
- “Independence versus Dominance in Personal Probability Axioms,” in vol. 3 of Uncertainty, Information and Social Choice: Essays in Honor of Kenneth Arrow, edited by W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, 129-171. Cambridge University, 1986.
- “Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria,” with Reinhard Selten. Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1978): 210-236.
- General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms, with Reinhard Selten. Springer, 1974.
- Technical Change, Moral Hazard, and the Decentralization Penalty when the Set of Possible Efforts Is Infinite, SSRN e-library 4097149, January 2023
- “Technical Change, Moral Hazard, and the Decentralization Penalty,” (with D, Wei), SSRN e-library 3659638, January 2023
At Haas since 1960
2013-present: Professor Emeritus, Haas School of Business and Professor of the Graduate School
1967-2013, Professor, Haas School of Business
1968 – 1970, Chairman, Center for Research in Management Science, Haas School of Business
1962 – 1967, Associate Professor, Haas School of Business
1960 – 1962, Assistant Professor, Haas School of Business
1954 – 1959, Economist, RAND Corporation
- Co-winner of Koc University prize, for best article in Economic Design, 1996
- Elected Fellow of the Econometric Society, 1975
- Fulbright-Hays Research Award, 1965-66
- Guggenheim Fellow, 1965-1966
- Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship, 1962-1963
- Awarded McKinsey Foundation Prize for Best Article in Journal of Business, 1960
- Fellow, Social Science Research Council, 1956-1957