• “Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty” (with D. Wei), in W. Trockel (ed), Social Design: Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz, Springer, 2019
• “Does More Information-gathering Effort Raise or Lower,the Average Quantity Produced?” (with J.G. Shanthikumar and J. Zhou), Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 69, March 2017, 104-117
• “A Newsvendor Who Chooses Informational Effort” (with J.G. Shanthikumar and Junjie  Zhou), Production and Operations Management,  Vol. 24, No. 1, 110-133, 2015  
•  “Technological Improvement and the Decentralization Penalty in a Simple Principal/Agent Model” (with Rouchen Liang and Dong Wei),  SSRN e-library 2945702, May 2018
• “Are Information-gathering and Producing Complements or Substitutes?”  (with J.G. Shanthikumar and Junjie  Zhou), Working Paper, January, 2014. SSRN2516174
• “Information Technology and the Organization of Firms.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 13 (2004): 473-515.
• “Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games,” with D. Courtney. Topics in Theoretical Economics (Berkeley Electronic Press) 6, no. 1 (2006).
• “Complementarity and Inefficiency in Sharing Games,” with D. Courtney. Review of Economic Design 13, no. 7 (2009): 7-43.
• “Organization Structure,” in Handbook of Economics and Information Systems, edited by T. Hendershott, 205-290. Elsevier, 2006.
• “Comparing Finite Mechanisms,” with Leonid Hurwicz. Economic Theory 21, 783-841 (2003).
• “Finite Allocation Mechanisms: Approximate Walrasian versus Approximate Direct Revelation,” with Leonid Hurwicz. Economic Theory 21 (2003): 545-572.
• “Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies,” with S. Reichelstein. Journal of Economic Theory (March 1998): 106-141.
• “Independence versus Dominance in Personal Probability Axioms,” in vol. 3 of Uncertainty, Information and Social Choice: Essays in Honor of Kenneth Arrow, edited by W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, 129-171. Cambridge University, 1986.
• “Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria,” with Reinhard Selten. Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1978): 210-236.
• General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms, with Reinhard Selten. Springer, 1974.

• Technical Change, Moral Hazard, and the Decentralization Penalty when the Set of Possible Efforts Is Infinite, SSRN e-library 4097149, January 2023
• “Technical Change, Moral Hazard, and the Decentralization Penalty,” (with D, Wei), SSRN e-library 3659638, January 2023

At Haas since 1960

2013-present:  Professor Emeritus, Haas School of Business and Professor of the Graduate School
1967-2013, Professor, Haas School of Business
1968 – 1970, Chairman, Center for Research in Management Science, Haas School of Business
1962 – 1967, Associate Professor, Haas School of Business
1960 – 1962, Assistant Professor, Haas School of Business
1954 – 1959, Economist, RAND Corporation

• Co-winner of Koc University prize, for best article in Economic Design, 1996
• Elected Fellow of the Econometric Society, 1975
• Fulbright-Hays Research Award, 1965-66
• Guggenheim Fellow, 1965-1966
• Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship, 1962-1963
• Awarded McKinsey Foundation Prize for Best Article in Journal of Business, 1960
• Fellow, Social Science Research Council, 1956-1957